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The outbreak of COVID-19 since Dec. 2019 has caused severe life and eco-
nomic damage worldwide, many countries are trapped by medical resource
constraints or absence of targeted therapeutics, and therefore the implement
of systemic policies to block this pandemic should be prioritized. Based on
the transmission mechanisms and physicochemical properties of betacoron-
aviruses, we construct a fine-grained transmission dynamics model (ICRD)
to forecast the crucial information of public concern, therein using dynam-
ical coefficients to quantify the impact of the implement time and intensity
of containment policies on the spread of epidemic. We find that the compre-
hensive investigation policy for susceptible population and the quarantine for
suspected cases eminently contribute to reduce casualties during the phase of
the dramatic increase of diagnosed cases. Statistic evidences strongly suggest
that society should take such forceful public health interventions to cut the
infection channels in the initial stage until the pandemic is interrupted.
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Introduction
Pneumonia caused by COVID-19 has evolved a worldwide pandemic for which humans have
paid more than 2.5 million infections and 180 thousand deaths as of Apr. 21th, 2020 (1) but
there are still billions of lives threatened (2–4). The transmission of the COVID-19 virus is con-
firmed through respiratory droplet (5) and has super infectivity beyond SARS and MERS (6)
which can even overwhelm countries with advanced medical facilities and therapeutics. Labora-
tory experiments proved that SARS-CoV-2 can survive temperatures of 56 ◦C for more than 30
minutes (7) and the experiences from tropical regions (8) illustrated COVID-19 still has trans-
mission capacity under the hydrothermal circumstance (9). Moreover, the incubation period of
COVID-19 is relatively short (5.5 days average) implying that it quickly onset after infection
and presents the corresponding clinical symptoms such as fever, cough, and fatigue (10). Re-
cently, the revised data released by Chinese health authorities definitely delivered that the case
fatality rate (CFI) of COVID-19 is seriously underestimated because the phenomenon of missed
reports and false positive in the early stage of the epidemic. Given the current statue of the lim-
ited pharmaceutical treatments and the unavailable targeted vaccines (11), the public health
interventions are demonstrated as the most functional precautions in many countries (12–14),
especially contributing to block the pandemic in Wuhan (15–18).
On Jan. 23th 2020, Chinese authorities imposed a lockdown in Wuhan since the suspected
and diagnosed cases exceed 2,000 which triggers public health emergency response in Hubei
Province. The containment efforts including school closures, transports bans and workplace
shutdowns were announced to limit the spread of virus. Nevertheless, the epidemic entered
the exponential period unstoppably from Feb. onwards (19, 20) and caused global concern and
panic. From Feb. 2nd, the successive delivery of the shelter hospitals implied Wuhan had the
sufficient wards to isolate and treat symptomatic patients. Meanwhile, people strictly followed
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the ordinances concerning social distancing, quarantine and careful hand and respiratory hy-
giene, subsequently wearing personal protective equipments (PPE) (21), isolating themselves
at home, and recording their temperature each day. The communities adopted a comprehen-
sive investigation strategy to detect the suspected cases and reported their trace while hiding
their private information (22) resulting in a sub-exponential growth of the infected curve un-
til a peak of 38,020 on Feb. 18th (23). Despite there is a ethical controversy about whether
suspicious persons should be mandatorily isolated from social networks, the experience from
Wuhan supported that this policy had effectively cut the transmission channels of COVID-19
and compel the pandemic to a mitigation stage. In post-pandemic phase (24), Wuhan contin-
ued to distribute disinfectors throughout the region including ventilation duct, water pipe, and
urban sewers where COVID-19 was sampled in Paris (25) and the central China government
stated the pandemic was basically blocked on Mar. 23th. Ultimately, after paying 4,632 deaths
nationwide and incalculable economic cost, China has ended its 76-day lockdown of Wuhan,
but the relative restrictions still remain in place.
The transmission dynamics observed in different continents and zones are markedly hetero-
geneous consulting time series data released by public health authorities (26–29). The funda-
mental reasons are that the fluctuation of the objective physical environments and the imple-
mentation intensity and duration of the containments policies restricted by public opinion, both
presenting challenges to build the dynamic model to forecast the tendency of the pandemic.
Furthermore, the CFI and recovery rate change as well with respect to different phases since
the gradual enrichment of care experiences and capacities. Therefore, we design dynamical
coefficients to quantify the variation of infectivity, investigation and isolation policies, vital dy-
namics to adjust the social response to the pandemic. Functionally, tuning the boundaries or the
derived functions of the dynamical coefficients can subtly regulate the containment efforts and
further observe their impact on the infected curves. We then simulate the results about advanc-
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ing or postponing relative policies and conclude that the output curves are sensitive to these
policies. The results of our model introduce statistic evidences that the containment policies
can effectively suppress or even block the outbreak of COVID-19 through mapping them into
measurable interval coefficients to observe their influence on the epidemic.
Modeling transmission dynamics of COVID-19
From the cases and traces information of patients released by the Wuhan government and CDC,
most individuals were infected from a symptomatic or pre-symptomatic infection, especially
during the period of exponential and sub-exponential growth, whereas the persons who were
infected through asymptomatic or environmental transmission merely accounted for a negli-
gible fraction of infected population. In practical, the boundaries of these four transmissions
are ambiguous and the number of asymptomatic infections and secondary infections caused by
them is difficult to count. Therefore, we generally assume that the non-isolated infected in-
dividuals are the main propagating sources on social networks. We divide the statues of the
population into 5 categories: (H)ealthy, (I)nfected, (C)onfirmed, (R)ecovered and (D)ead (Fig.
1). More granular, the infected group I consists of the confirmed C and unconfirmed I − C
and therein the confirmed individuals C are either isolated βC (β is the isolation rate) or non-
isolated (1 − β)C. The transmission dynamics of virus can be fully described by the ordinary
differential equations (namely ICRD model) with respect to time t:
∂tI = α(I − βC)(1− ( I
N
)−γ)− (σ + κ)C − (δ + µ)(I − C) (1)
∂tC = η(I − C)− σC − κC (2)
∂tR = σC + δ(I − C) (3)
∂tD = κC + µ(I − C) (4)
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The infected but non-isolated group I − βC has the vital infectiousness since they not only are
the virus carriers but can randomly walk on social networks. The average number of secondary
infections an infected would induce over the period from infected to isolated T (transmission
is terminated) is defined as the basic reproduction number R0. The infectiousness intensity in
a unit period is α = R0/T and the new increase of infected individuals thereby are α(I −
βC). Apparently, α is inversely proportional to social distancing, determining the increment
of infected cases each day and tuning α could capture the effect of national isolation policies
subtly. Nevertheless, one person would be repeatedly secondarily infected with high probability
when the infection density in the community reaches a critical level and above statistic value
significantly greater than the true value. We then present a harmonic function (1− (I/N)−γ) to
tackle the redundancy counting dilemma, in which N represents the community population and
γ denotes the harmonic coefficient. α(1−(I/N)−γ) shows the infectivity of an individual would
degrade as the group density of infection increases. Meanwhile, there would be a proportion of
infected people who recover (cured after treatment σC or spontaneous recovery κC) or die (die
with treatment δ(I − C) or without treatment µ(I − C)) in one unit statistical period, where
σ, κ, δ, µ are daily cure rate, incurable mortality rate, natural recovery rate, and non-treatment
mortality rate, respectively. Hence ∂tI quantifies the aggregate incremental cases of infection
(Eq. (1)) after removing the recovered and dead population. Limiting to the objective medical
testing ability of laboratories, only a fraction of η suspected cases could receive diagnosis within
the unit statistical time (η is the algebraic mapping of investigation policy), so the increment
of confirmed cases ∂tC equals to the difference between the newly positive diagnosed cases
η(I−C) and dead or recovered cases (σ+κ)C. Evently, we could deduce the daily increase of
recovered or dead cases integrating the recovery ratio σ, δ and mortality κ, µ with the infected
population (please see Materials and Methods for detailed derivation of Eqs. (1-4)).
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Using dynamical parameters to quantify the investigation and
isolation policies
Before we have discussed that β and η reflect the impact of the isolation and investigation poli-
cies on a pandemic in ICRD model, respectively. The constant coefficients in Eq. (1-4) assume
that the containment efforts or the physical and chemical characteristics of the coronavirus re-
main permanent in long-term transmission, and undoubtedly it is counterintuitive. In fact, the
governments tend to adopt more compulsive policies as the dramatic increase of death cases,
residents choose isolate themselves spontaneously with more publicity on negative news, and
the testing and diagnosis techniques would be visibly improved after the deeply studying of the
virus’s properties. Hence the measures and intensity of the society to fight the pandemic change
in different phases. For instance, initially, due to the lack of awareness of the virus, people are
reluctant to maintain social distancing with others (R0 and α are relatively large), so the virus
has explosive infectivity at this stage. Subsequently, with the exponential increase of infected
cases, the government would announce voluntary or compulsive isolation policies to reduce α
until it remains low (Fig. 2a). Furthermore, many susceptible patients cannot be diagnosed
because of the limited medical resource in the preliminary stage. However, the promotion of
the testing techniques and the enhancement of the investigation policies (η rises) would strongly
reverse this situation in the successive stages. Therefore, we introduce the dynamic coefficients
to simulate the transformation of propagation:
α = a ∗ e−bt + c (5)
η = u ∗ arctan(vt) + w (6)
Fig. 2 illustrates the curves of dynamical α and η, and it is clear that the parameters a, c (or u, v)
determine the boundaries of α (or η) that catch intensity scope of the isolation (investigation)
policies and b (or v) is a critic to evaluate the response time of these policies, both regulating
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the tendency of epidemic (see Supply material for other dynamic coefficients and the tuning
methods).
Statistic evidences for the power of comprehensive investiga-
tion and compulsive isolation policies
Fig. 3A shows that SEIR model forecasts the existing infected cases had reached a peak of
4,885,672 at Mar. 3rd that two orders of magnitude higher than the actual value and the trans-
mission would be effectively controlled before Apr. 17th without external constraints. SEIR
inappropriately concludes that more than 50% of the population in Wuhan would be infected
in this worldwide epidemic, and unfortunately it ignores the dead cases caused by COVID-19.
Static coefficients based-ICRD (S-ICRD) model predicts the existing infected cases would sub-
exponentially increase to 4,2729 by Feb. 8th and the pandemic would be basically blocked at
May. 27th. It is noticeable that the infected curve in Fig. 3B declines extraordinarily slower
than the clinical statistics resulting from the illogical assumption of constant public health in-
terventions and it explains why the eventual death toll (8,195) markedly higher than the official
surveys (3,869) as well.
Compared with the SEIR and S-ICRD, the dynamic coefficients based-ICRD model (D-
ICRD) has infinitesimal mean square errors (MSE) with the data released by NHC (Fig. 4). D-
ICRD estimates that the existing infected and confirmed cases would dramatically raised to their
peaks (41986, 38758) at Feb. 14th and 17th respectively (Fig 4A), approximately consisting
with the practical inflexion Feb. 18th (38020). In Phase 1, the incomplete investigation policies
and limited testing techniques contribute the large interval between the infected and confirmed
curves, whereas they gradually coincide with the strengthening of surveillance in phase 2. The
truth-values of the recovered cases are always located in the 95% confidence interval (CI) of the
curve predicted by D-ICRD but the estimated values are slight higher since the patients who are
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spontaneously recovered were excluded in the statistics (Fig. 4B). The death cases calculated
by D-ICRD eccentrically deviate from the statistical data before Mar. 8th in Fig. 4C. Until Apr.
17th the government announced that there were 1290 missing victims in the initial collecting
stage and then increased death cases to 3869 that located in the 95% CI [3576, 3952] of the
predicted value.
Fig. 2 straightway illustrates that controlling b (or v) can accurately regulate the imple-
ment time of the isolation (investigation) policies and the corresponding transmission results
are shown in Fig. 5. The peaks of the existing infected cases would reduced 12,725 or 17,009
if the isolation policies were executed 2 or 3 days in advance respectively, and thousands of
innocent individuals would been saved (Fig. 5B). Inversely, postponing the quarantine policies
for 4 (or 7) days would induce another 15,900 (or 53,753) people to be infected and increase the
death toll to 5,454 (or 6,783). The advancement or delay of the investigation policies would also
cause similar results, but their intensity is softer than the isolation policies. For instance, the
comprehensive investigation order issued 7 or 12 days earlier would protect 9,567 or 15, 709
people from infection, respectively. Meanwhile, benefiting from the quarantine of suspected
persons, medical pressure would be relieved and then 661 or 940 sufferers would be rescued
from death. Nevertheless, if such policies were delayed for 17 days, more than a quarter of
contacts would be infected or die considering that the increasing of suspected nodes on social
networks incredibly shorten their connections with the healthy nodes. Accordingly, the above
evidences definitely exhibit that this pandemic is extremely sensitive to the public health inter-
ventions, particularly in the initial stage, which can forcefully cut off the possible transmission
routes of COVID-19. Beyond that, D-ICRD also confirms that measures, such as using personal
protective equipments (PPE, lowering α), monitoring and recording temperature (increasing σ),
declaring community emergency response plan (reducing µ) and so on, can all effectively sup-
press the spread of virus.
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Discussion
Due to the Wuhan government implemented mandatory closures at the early stage of the epi-
demic to prohibit the free movement of population and issued home quarantine order to isolate
internal social contacts during the Spring festival, Wuhan is an ideal research object about the
transmission of COVID-19, in which we can detect the general propagation laws about this
pandemic. Based on the transmission mechanisms and physicochemical properties of coron-
avirus, in this paper, we builded a dynamics model named D-ICRD to observe the dynamical
change of the existing infected cases, the existing confirmed cases, the cumulative recovered
cases and the cumulative dead cases with respect to time in Wuhan. Beyond that, our model
could also deduce the significant pandemic indexes such that cumulative infected cases, cumu-
lative confirmed cases, new suspected cases etc. Functionally, D-ICRD could not only display
the characteristic of nature virus transmission but also precisely quantify the influence of the
extra containments on the spread of COVID-19.
We designed the dynamical coefficients associating with the implement time and intensity
of the relative policies to simulate the transmission environment of COVID-19 in Wuhan. Com-
pared with the static coefficients, the dynamical coefficients can more penetratingly capture the
rational adjustment of social response to the severity of the epidemic. For example, many clas-
sical models assume the constant basic reproduction number but we believe that it changes with
the intervention factors and eventually this change is mapped on the transmission coefficient
α. Moreover, the improvement of therapy and the use of specific medicines would significantly
affect the cure rate and mortality. Hereupon D-ICRD entirely reproduced the time series data
released by NHC, and it balances robustness and agility.
Then, we subtly regulated the implement time or intensity of these interventional policies
through changing the derived functions or boundaries of the corresponding dynamical coeffi-
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cients to verify the contribution of such policies to suppress the epidemic. We found that the
infected and death cases would sharply decrease if the quarantine strategies could be promul-
gated slightly in advance. Nevertheless, D-ICRD indicates postponing such plans would cause
at least additional millions of infected population worldwide, and undoubtedly the catastrophic
consequences of abrogating these ordinances are uncountable. Furthermore, the intensity of the
isolation and investigation polices would determine the trend of the pandemic as well. The sta-
tistical evidences show the forceful public health interventions can effectively suppress or even
block the outbreak based on Wuhan’s experiences although COVID-19 has extremely strong in-
fectivity (droplet transmission and suspected aerosol transmission) and lethality (CFR > 7.69%
in Wuhan, before Feb. 20th). We suggest that the governments or communities should adopt the
containments such as comprehensive investigating and tracking the temperature and traces in-
formation about the residents, immediately isolating the suspected and diagnosed infected indi-
viduals to prevent the spread of COVID-19 on social networks. Although such near-compulsory
national policies may cause severe economic recession or ethical problems, we must realize that
society is a community of life composed of all human beings, and we profoundly influence each
other whereupon we should collaborate to fight this vital pandemic together. Given that there
are no target therapeutics or vaccine currently, each of us should cooperate with these policies
in a responsible manner, isolate ourselves from others, form an island, and ultimately prevent
the spread of the virus.
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Figure 1: Transmission mechanism of COVID-19 on social networks. The group of in-
fected but non-isolated (blue and yellow nodes) is the main propagating source of virus through
physical contacts (droplet), especially over the incubation period (30, 31). The infected pa-
tients would die or produce antibodies without treatment but undoubtedly the herd immunity
would take a long time to achieve and uncountable individuals would lose their lives in this
process. Therefore, the diagnosed patients should be isolated from social networks to cut the
transmission links (yellow edges). Furthermore, the red edges are more dangerous for the ex-
posed persons and the comprehensive investigation policy for all people and the nucleic acid
testing strategy for symptomatic patients should be taken to remove their connections with oth-
ers. Meanwhile, some carrier would migrate to other place through the global transportation
networks. The experiences from China demonstrated that the external input is the largest threat
in the post-transmission period (32).
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Figure 2: Mathematical representations of dynamical coefficients with respect to isolation
policy and investigation policy respectively. (A) tuning the parameter b of α can subtly regu-
late the implement time of isolation policy. We choose α = 0.4 as the critical value for isolation
which this policy is fully implemented. The practical isolation policy curve b = 0.10 (Feb.
17th) is selected as the baseline to compare results caused by advancing or postponing of this
policy. The boundaries of α ∈ [1.8, 0.2] are determined by the basic reproduction number R0
and the duration from infected to infected. (B) tuning the parameter v of η can reflect the rate
of community investigation for the infected but undiagnosed patients. We choose η = 0.5 as
the threshold of daily investigation rate and v = 0.05 (Feb. 24th) as the baseline to compare the
impact of the implement time of investigation policy to the pandemic trend. The boundaries of
η ∈ [0.2, 0.7] are determined by the case capacity of the hospitals.
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Figure 3: Results from the numerical simulations about COVID-19 transmission tendency
of SEIR and S-ICRD models. (A) SEIR predicts that the existing infected cases would reach
a peak of 4,885,672 on Mar. 3rd and the pandemic would be basically blocked on Apr. 17th
in Wuhan. More than half of the population would be infected by COVID-19 but the fraction
of exposed population is less than the infected population which is inconsistent with the ob-
servation. (B) S-ICRD predicts that the peak of the existing infected cases is 42,729 on Feb.
8th and the epidemic alert would be lifted after May. The forecasted number of infections is
consistent with the actual data but the relative crucial time points and the final deaths have a
great deviation with the observation in Wuhan since the constant coefficients are inappropriate
to simulate the transmission dynamics of COVID-19.
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Figure 4: Comparison of the results generated by D-ICRD model and the time series data
released by NHC. In this figure the dots denote official data and the lines denote the data
calculated by D-ICRD in which the shadow areas denote the 95% confidence interval (CI).
The entire pandemic in Wuhan is divided into three phases: Phase 1 [Jan. 23th - Feb. 14th];
Phase 2 [Feb.15 - Mar. 23th]; Phase 3 [Mar. 24th - ]. Sta. denotes the official statistical data
and Hos. denotes the data counted in hospitals. (A) the curves of the existing infected and
confirmed cases. The gap between the infected curve and the confirmed curve indicates the
number of the infected but unconfirmed group (33). Most dots are located in the shadow areas
except for Phase 1 because the health authorities clarified that there were many infected cases
of underreporting. (B) The curve of recovered cases. The calculated data is slightly larger than
the amounts counted in hospitals since the spontaneously curative patients are not included and
a few medical institutions failed to connect with the information systems in time. (C) The curve
of death cases. Blue dots denote the originally released data and the red dots denote the revised
data by NHC. According to the revised data, mortality is seriously underestimated at Phase
1 and Phase 2, and the yellow curve is more representative of the death trend of COVID-19
pandemic.
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Figure 5: Impact of the implement time of isolation and investigation policies on transmis-
sion tendency of COVID-19 in Wuhan. The red lines are the results of the baseline policies
selected in Fig. 2 and the other lines’ colors are matched with Fig. 2 representing advance or
delay the corresponding policy. The arrows show the increment or decrement of the death cases
compared with the baseline of different policies. (A) and (C) The curves of infected persons
calculated by the dynamical coefficient α (isolation policy) and η (investigation policy) in Fig.
2 respectively. (B) and (D) The curves of deaths corresponding to (A) and (C) and they provide
the statistic evidences how public health interventions save the lives of people.
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